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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES AFTER
DAVIS: IS THE GLASS HALF EMPTY OR
HALF FULL?
Myrna S. Raeder*
INTRODUCTION
The revolution wrought by the 2004 Supreme Court decision
in Crawford v. Washington1 had its most dramatic impact on
domestic violence cases. Crawford prohibited courtroom use of
“testimonial” statements by unavailable witnesses who were not
previously subjected to cross-examination, unless the defendant
forfeited the right to confrontation by causing the witness’
absence.2 Since the vast majority of victims of domestic violence
do not cooperate with the prosecution,3 and statements made to
the police in such circumstances are arguably testimonial,
Crawford spelled disaster in cases where victims did not testify.
Numerous reasons have been offered for why these women
initially call the police and then subsequently refuse to testify in
court.4 While women want to stop the violence, and calling upon
the police may be the most likely way to ensure this result, other
*

Myrna Raeder is a Professor at Southwestern University School of
Law. These comments update parts of her article Remember the Ladies and
Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005) [hereinafter Remember the Ladies], in
light of Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Id. at 62, 68.
3
Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 328-30; State v. Mechling, 633
S.E.2d 311, 324-25 (W. Va. 2006).
4
Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 364; Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at
324-25.
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complex motivations are also at play.5 For example, their
batterers are often the fathers of their children, who they love
and hope will reform. In misdemeanor cases, where the
punishment is not likely to be lengthy, some women view a
conviction as jeopardizing their batterer’s ability to hold a job
and support the family. Other, more sinister reasons for their
nonappearance include threats or physical violence aimed at
preventing their testimony and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) caused by their repeated abuse.
In an earlier era, prosecutions would end when women
refused to cooperate, but in recent years, zero tolerance for
domestic violence has gained wide community support.6 This
resulted in no-drop policies by prosecutorial agencies, and socalled victimless prosecutions in which a woman’s excited pleas
for help on 911 calls, and to police at crime scenes, were
admitted along with testimony by police officers and medical
personnel concerning any bruises or other indications of
violence.7 Statements by the absent victims satisfied the preCrawford reliability based approach to the Confrontation Clause
adopted by Ohio v. Roberts.8
In contrast, after the first wave of dismissals and reversals
caused by Crawford, victim’s advocates worried that the
testimonial approach would return us to the days when domestic
violence was considered a private concern, not a public outrage.
Instead, Crawford’s failure to define what is testimonial led to
two years of judges reading tea leaves, and reaching contrary
outcomes.9 To the relief of prosecutors, a number of courts
began to admit victims’ excited utterances made in 911 calls and
to the police in the field, finding them to be “nontestimonial.”
These courts reasoned that such statements were simply cries for
help, not police interrogation, or they were too informal to
resemble the ex parte affidavits or prior testimony that had been
5
6
7
8
9

See generally Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 325-30.
Id. at 327-28, 368.
Id. at 328.
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 333-47.

RAEDER

6/22/2007 1:12 AM

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES AFTER DAVIS

761

traditionally excluded by the Confrontation Clause.10
In Davis v. Washington11 the Court has finally addressed
these issues, and rendered a split decision that satisfies neither
the prosecution nor the defense. Davis combined two separate
domestic violence cases, in which neither of the female victims
appeared at trial. The decision unanimously affirmed the
admission of a 911 call in Davis,12 but with only one dissent,13
rejected the admission of statements in Hammon14 made by the
defendant’s wife who spoke excitedly to an officer in person at
the scene. To reach these results, Davis adopted a “primary
purpose” test for determining whether a statement is testimonial,
which provides that when the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution, a statement is
testimonial.15
The defense will be pleased that Davis held that volunteered
statements were products of interrogation and employed an
objective evaluation of motivation for determining if a statement
is testimonial, which arguably favors a broader view of
confrontation. However, treating dual purpose statements as
nontestimonial in the absence of a primary motivation to create
testimony clearly favors the government, because it denies the
defendant the ability to cross-examine declarants who make such
statements. For example, defendants will not be able to crossexamine absent complainants who made damning statements
against them whenever the primary motivation of the
interrogation was to obtain assistance during an ongoing
emergency.
Conversely, prosecutors will be pleased that the new test
focuses on the primary purpose of the interrogation, rather than
requiring that police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency be
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 333-36.
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
Id. at 2280 (affirming State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005)).
See id. at 2280-81.
Id. (reversing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005)).
Id. at 2273-74.
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the sole motivation. However, prosecutors may be concerned
about the apparent focus on the police officer’s motivation,16 not
merely the motivation of the absent witness. Moreover, Davis
did not create a separate category for domestic violence cases,
which means that testimonial statements are still barred unless a
victim testifies, or there is specific evidence that the defendant
caused the victim’s absence from trial.17
Judges will likely find that Davis’ bright line is illusory and
hard to apply. Indeed, Justice Thomas called the test
unworkable,18 and it appears no more predictable than the
reliability standard that Crawford abandoned.19 Moreover,
Justice Scalia, who authored both Crawford and Davis,
recognized that the nature of the statement may change once the
exigency is over, requiring courts to carefully redact
statements.20 At a minimum, Davis settled that the identity of an
assailant who is battering a victim as she calls 911 is
admissible.21 It also should ensure that the admission of any
statement in response to police questioning after the threat has
ended, such as when the assailant flees or has been separated
from the victim, is problematic when the victim does not appear
at trial, and no evidence of forfeiture exists.22
After Davis, prosecutors will continue to dismiss or lose
cases where the testimonial statements are key, unless they take
the drastic step of arresting victims who ignore their subpoenas,
a step that punishes victims for the crimes of their abusers.
Moreover, given the testimonial approach, it makes sense to
reevaluate how domestic violence felonies and misdemeanors are
being litigated across America.23 In a world of limited
prosecutorial resources, decisions may need to be made about
16

Id.
Id. at 2279-80.
18
Id. at 2285 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64 (discussing the subjectivity of the
reliability test).
20
See id. at 2277-78.
21
Id. at 2277.
22
See id. at 2279. See infra Part IV.
23
See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 367-73.
17
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identifying which cases to vigorously pursue in the criminal
justice system, and which to refer to quasi-criminal diversionary
programs.
The remainder of this Article will briefly explore Davis’
impact on the following topics in the context of domestic
violence litigation: (1) assessing whether a statement made to
law enforcement personnel is testimonial; (2) assessing whether
a statement made to someone other than law enforcement
personnel is testimonial; (3) difficulties with the Crawford/Davis
approach; (4) establishing forfeiture and other procedural issues;
and (5) suggestions for prosecutors in light of Davis. In addition
to critiquing Davis and identifying trends in the appellate caselaw, criteria will be suggested to help determine whether or not
a statement is testimonial, and when forfeiture is appropriate.
I. ASSESSING WHETHER A STATEMENT MADE TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IS TESTIMONIAL
Crawford established the testimonial framework, but gave
little guidance as to how to interpret it in the domestic violence
context, where the statements are not made by suspects in
custody, but by victims frantically seeking help. As a result,
many courts found such statements far removed from the
governmental abuse that seemed at the root of Crawford’s
concerns.24 In contrast, Davis presented two typical domestic
violence fact patterns that populate one-third of the criminal
calendars in urban jurisdictions,25 and overwhelmingly rely upon
complainants who are uncooperative.26 Davis addressed 911 calls
as well as field investigations, but its holding was generalized,
focusing more on the context in which the statements were made
than their method of transmission. The Davis test is deceptively
24

Id. at 333-47.
See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 45 (June 2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs05.pdf (stating that approximately
one third of felony assault charges in 11 large counties during a one-month
period involved family violence).
26
See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 330.
25
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simple:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.27
While this standard still is capable of wide variation in
interpretation, at least a few things are set. First, 911 calls can
be testimonial, regardless of who employs the operator. Second,
911 calls and preliminary field investigations can generate
testimonial statements despite their lack of formality. Whether
Justice Thomas will be proven correct in his view that the
standard is unworkable28 will depend on how the Supreme Court
refines it in light of likely conflicts among lower courts in
defining ongoing emergencies. However, in its current version,
the standard is little more than a tautology: a statement is not
testimonial when needed to resolve an ongoing emergency, and
testimonial when not needed to resolve it. The Court gives few
concrete suggestions about how to identify an ongoing
emergency or determine if the statement helps to resolve it,
other than Justice Scalia’s reference to the instinctive ability of
officers to distinguish between questions necessary to secure
their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence.29 In the same vein,
Davis cavalierly pronounces “testimonial statements are what
they are.”30 In other words, paraphrasing Justice Stewart’s bon
mot concerning pornography,31 we will know whether statements
27
28
29
30
31

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
Id. at 2285 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2277.
Id. at 2279 n.6.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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help resolve an ongoing emergency when we hear them.
The absence of any reference to medical emergencies,
despite such mention in pre-Davis cases,32 would seem to
indicate a narrow view of nontestimonial statements made to
police officers. Yet, while statements made well after the
incident should be fairly easy to discern, some courts are
already viewing emergencies expansively. This is understandable
since the transcript of the 911 tape in Davis indicates that the
defendant left shortly after the start of the call, but the Court did
not indicate when the call morphed into being testimonial,
claiming that the only question it certified related to the
defendant’s identity, which occurred at the beginning of the
call.33
Davis emphasized that the caller was speaking in the present
tense, and that the operator needed information to determine
what danger the officers would face in resolving the dispute.34
This was contrasted to the field investigation in Hammon where
the victim denied any problem and was separated from the
defendant when she admitted her husband assaulted her.35 Since
Davis indicated that information “needed to address the exigency
of the moment”36 was not testimonial, concern has been voiced
that officers and operators will tailor their questions to obtain
evidence rather than to resolve the emergency in order to ensure
admissibility at trial.37 It seems hypertechnical that admission of
a statement might rest on whether the questioner asks what is
happening, rather than what happened, but Davis leaves open
the possibility of such a result.
Courts have recognized that the Davis analysis is “flexible
and inherently fact based, and the existence or lack of
government interrogation does not necessarily determine whether
32

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 557 (Mass.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006).
33
126 S. Ct. at 2277.
34
Id. at 2276.
35
Id. at 2278.
36
Id. at 2277.
37
The Supreme Court—2005 Term Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV.
125, 217 (2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
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a statement is testimonial.”38 Several decisions have attempted to
distill a multifactor test from Davis and some focus on
statements to police. For example, a statement is not testimonial
if: (1) the victim spoke about the events as they were actually
happening; (2) the victim faced a bona fide physical threat; (3)
the questions and answers viewed objectively were necessary to
resolve the present emergency, rather than simply learn what
previously happened; (4) there was a significant difference in the
formality of questioning between frantic answers given in a
potentially unsafe environment by phone when compared to the
calm station house questioning in Crawford.39 Other decisions
speak more generally: a statement is testimonial if (1) it would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial; (2) the circumstances
objectively indicate that a statement taken during interrogation
by a law enforcement officer was made when there was no
ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose was to prove past
events rather than to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency; and (3) the focus of analysis was more on the
witness’ statement, and less upon any interrogator’s questions.40
However, such tests do not necessarily foretell the outcome of a
specific case.
In the Crawford and Beyond symposium, Professor Kirst
ably attempted to predict the future of Confrontation Clause
analysis by divining the results of the post-Davis certiorari
dispositions.41 Several themes emerged, including the
defendant’s presence or absence from the scene of the incident,
and whether or not he was under police control.42 However, it is
unclear that these will ultimately provide the bright lines that
could make an ongoing emergency test easy to apply. Already
38

State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 321 (W. Va. 2006).
State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 273-74 (Or. App. 2006); see also
Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 714 (Nev. 2006) (four-part test for 911
calls).
40
Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 321-22.
41
Roger W. Kirst, Confrontation Rules After Davis v. Washington, 15
J.L. & POL’Y 635 (2007).
42
Id.
39
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the pre-Davis tendency to find all 911 calls by distraught victims
to be nontestimonial has reappeared in the post-Davis cases.
For example, People v. Walker43 held that a 911 call was a
call for help, even though it was made by a neighbor to whom
the victim fled seeking help after she escaped from her home by
jumping from a second-story balcony while the defendant
slept.44 The victim told her neighbor that she could not return
home, which indicated that the specific incident was over.
Indeed, the defendant claimed that the victim had waited two
hours after the beating to ensure the defendant was asleep before
fleeing.45 Thus, Walker seems to take a more global view that
the emergency is resolved only when the defendant is captured.
Although Walker briefly mentioned questions about whether
the couple’s child was present, it gave no indication of where
the child was, or that any violence had been threatened to the
child.46 Ironically, the opinion did not discuss whether the
neighbor could have testified to what the victim had initially
said, although it held that the neighbor’s written narrative of the
victim’s statement given to the police when they arrived, was
testimonial.47 The conviction was reversed because the details
supplied by the later oral and written information provided to
the police were found to be testimonial, but the 911 holding
should not be considered surplusage. In other words, it suggests
a pattern that is likely to be repeated in evaluating other 911
calls, such as State v. Wright, in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court48 found that the latter part of a 911 call, after the victim’s
sister was told the defendant was in custody, was nontestimonial
because the goal was to reassure her and her sister that the
defendant had really been apprehended, not to create
testimony.49
43

No. 250006, 2006 WL 3365521 (Mich. App. Nov. 21, 2006).
Id. at *1.
45
See facts discussed in People v. Walker, 697 N.W.2d 159, 161-62
(Mich. App. 2005).
46
Walker, 2006 WL 3365521.
47
Id. at *4.
48
No. Ao3-1197, 2007 WL 177690 (Minn. Jan. 25, 2007).
49
Id. at *9-10.
44
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Similarly, it is unclear whether the focus on assessing the
emergency will result in every initial statement of a 911 call
being deemed nontestimonial. Justice Scalia separated the
investigatory collection of ex parte testimonial statements by the
police from their attempted use at trial in violation of the
Confrontation Clause.50 Recognizing the distinction between trial
and investigatory use of 911 calls appears to permit a more
cautious approach to evaluating their admissibility, encouraging
judges to evaluate the tenor of the entire statement. Looking
only at the investigatory function could arguably justify
admitting the first sentence of every conversation, because the
caller always has to explain the nature of the incident in order
for the operator to determine how to resolve the perceived
emergency. Calling a statement nontestimonial until the operator
can figure out whether the danger is past or present would
effectively deny the right of cross-examination based on the
sentence structure and speech pattern of the caller, hardly a
principled distinction for separating Sixth Amendment wheat
from chaff.
Yet this is already what some courts are doing. For example,
in State v Camarena,51 the victim called 911, hung up, and
when the operator called her back to ask if there was a problem,
she answered, “Yeah, my boyfriend hit me but then he left.”52
Before providing details she also specified he had departed by
car.53 Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Camarena
held that the victim’s initial response as well as her response
concerning the nature of the injuries were not testimonial
because they occurred immediately after the assault, the
defendant could have returned, it was likely that the victim was
seeking assistance against a possible renewal of the attack, and
the level of formality of the interrogation was unlike that in
Crawford and Hammon.54 Thus, Justice Scalia appears unduly
50
51
52
53
54

126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6.
145 P.3d 267 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 275.
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optimistic that ongoing emergencies are easy to spot.
Indeed, I would not be surprised if pressure emerges to
change the typical 911 script to better fit with Davis by
specifically asking as the first question whether the caller is
presently in danger. The second question would be what is the
nature of the ongoing emergency, before more identifying details
are requested. As a practical matter, most emergency systems
will display the address of the caller even without an inquiry.
Davis also expressed concern that the police need to know the
identity of the assailant in order to assess the threat to their own
safety and danger to the potential victim.55 However, this
information can be revealed by asking if the individual is known
to have access to a weapon or currently appears to be on drugs,
as opposed to asking the identity of the defendant or specific
details of the defendant’s conduct. If the defendant is armed and
the incident is still in progress, Davis suggests that his identity is
needed to end the emergency,56 but in other circumstances
identity appears only necessary to decide whom to prosecute.
Given that the 911 system is considered a proxy for police
involvement, we should expect the defense to challenge the
order and content of questions that appear designed to produce
nontestimonial statements despite Justice Scalia’s belief that
emergencies are immutable and not affected by police conduct.57
For example, in Vinson v. Texas,58 the victim’s identification
of her boyfriend as her assailant to an officer at the scene was
held to be nontestimonial, in part because the officer said he
didn’t feel safe until backup arrived, in a situation where the
defendant entered the room and yelled at the victim who was
recently and badly injured.59 One would assume that the officer
55

126 S. Ct. at 2279.
See, e.g., Lile v. State, No. 79A02-0601-CR-31, 2006 WL 3306004,
at *3 (Ind. App. Nov, 15, 2006) (affirming admission of 911 call made after
defendant killed first victim, where caller was hiding under bed before
defendant dragged her out and forced her into car).
57
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6.
58
Vinson v. State, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR, 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 WL
2291000 (Tex. App. 1st, Aug. 10, 2006).
59
Id. at *8-10.
56
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could have controlled or separated the defendant, placing him in
the squad car until he finished assessing the situation.
Distinguishing the facts in Hammon because the assailant was
not present during the interview seems fairly disingenuous,
given that Hammon also tried to intervene and was separated
from his wife.60
Even reading certiorari dispositions concerning field
investigations indicates that the dividing line between testimonial
and nontestimonial statements is not as obvious as Davis would
suggest. For example, pre-Davis, in State v. Hembertt,61 the
Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the admission of a detailed
statement made by a woman to police responding to a 911 call.
The victim volunteered such an amount of detail that the officers
stopped her to locate the assailant. The emergency was not
considered to be over until the defendant was found inside.
However, were the details of the assault necessary to resolve the
emergency? The Supreme Court denied certiorari, upholding the
conviction,62 although numerous other cases were vacated.
While one can never know the reason for a denial, Hembertt
sends a message that admission of detail is not fatal to a
conviction, whether because it is not error or harmless error,
and encourages courts to find statements to be nontestimonial
whenever the defendant remains in the home, even though the
victim is outside and no longer in danger.
Defining the scope of the emergency also proved difficult in
State v. Warsame,63 which held that statements made to two
officers were nontestimonial, although the victim’s first words
revealed, “My boyfriend just beat me up.”64 The court reasoned
that the woman’s sister who was in the fleeing vehicle with the
defendant might be in danger, although the victim did not claim
she was kidnapped.65 It was also unclear what happened to
another sister who was at the house where the victim had been
60
61
62
63
64
65

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
696 N.W.2d 473, 479 (Neb. 2005).
Hembertt v. Nebraska, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006).
723 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. App. 2006).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 641-42.
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beaten.66 In deciding where to draw the line, the court concluded
that the ongoing emergency “need not be limited to the
complainant’s predicament or the location where she is
questioned by police.”67 Thus, the complainant’s entire narrative
was considered nontestimonial.68
Another questionable result in a domestic violence case was
reached in State v. Rodriguez,69 which held that statements to an
officer on two separate occasions were nontestimonial cries for
help, although on both occasions the statements were made
outside of the presence of the defendant.70 Indeed, the same
result would have been justified by a forfeiture analysis, given
the victim’s statements about being threatened by the defendant
and his family, and that the police couldn’t protect her or her
child. Only the statement that the defendant was inside the home
underneath the couch with a knife71 appears arguably
nontestimonial.
Yet even this points out the difficulty with the standard. As
previously mentioned, many judges understandably view the
emergency as ongoing until the defendant is apprehended for
purposes of determining whether statements are testimonial,
despite the fact that the victim is out of harm’s way. Thus, the
confrontation right seems dictated by the fortuity of whether the
defendant is still at home, rather than has fled. Some courts go
further, suggesting the emergency is not over if he could return.
Such results appear totally out of keeping with the Supreme
Court’s narrow view of context in assessing whether an
emergency existed in Hammon, and quite different from the
nontestimonial statement of a victim running out of an apartment
screaming, “that’s him, that’s him. He’s the one that just hit
me.”72 In that case, the officers acted as Justice Scalia
66

See id.
Id. at 641.
68
State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 643 (Minn. App. 2006).
69
722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
70
Id. at 140-41.
71
Id. at 141.
72
State v. McKenzie, No. 87610, 2006 WL 3095671 (Ohio Ct. App.,
Nov. 2, 2006).
67
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envisioned, securing the defendant in the police car before
asking the victim for details, which were deemed testimonial.73
II. ASSESSING WHETHER A STATEMENT MADE TO SOMEONE
OTHER THAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IS TESTIMONIAL
Whether Crawford and Davis leave a gaping hole in
Confrontation Clause protection by which statements made to
people having no relationship to law enforcement can march in
without any regulation is unresolved. Outside of the child abuse
context, cases generally reject protection for statements made to
private individuals.74 Several domestic violence cases have found
such statements to be nontestimonial.75 However, Davis
specifically left open whether statements made to someone other
than law enforcement personnel are testimonial.76 Realistically,
when a victim cries out for help to those around her such as
neighbors, relatives, friends, acquaintances, or strangers on the
street, the question will focus on what assistance the victim
hopes to receive. Only when it appears that the cry is to obtain
police aid for a completed criminal act will the calls likely be
considered testimonial.77 In many cases, the confidant is not the
person who calls the police, suggesting that the statement is not
testimonial.78 This should help the prosecution, although it has
73

Id. at *5.
Compare Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005) (finding that
domestic violence victim’s statements to friend not testimonial) with King v.
Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779) (holding that the admission
of a young rape victim’s statements to her mother was error; cited with
approval in Davis). See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990)
(excluding child’s statements to private pediatrician as violating Confrontation
Clause; holding implicitly approved in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58-59).
75
See, e.g., Lile v. State, 2006 WL 3306004, at *1-3 (finding voice
message to daughter as she saw defendant return with shotgun was
nontestimonial).
76
Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1.
77
See State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323-24 (W. Va. 2006)
(remanding to determine if statements of domestic violence victim to neighbor
who called 911 were testimonial).
78
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 561-62
74
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troubling implications about the devaluation of cross-examination
and live witnesses whenever the police are not involved. It also
suggests inclusion of testimonial statements at trial may be
viewed as harmless error when they duplicate admissible
information. However, some courts appear to reject harmless
error when the additional information provides persuasive
details.79
Another frequent source of testimony in domestic violence
cases comes from medical personnel and records. Again, the
question arises as to whether both the victim’s statements and
the doctor’s diagnosis can be admitted if the declarant is absent
from trial. Some courts determine whether the examination and
questioning was for a “diagnostic purpose” and whether the
“statement was the by-product of substantive medical activity.”80
Most decisions concerning medical statements occur in child
abuse cases.81 However, a few domestic violence and rape cases
appear to find such statements nontestimonial when the physician
has no role in investigating the assault,82 or when the statements
describe the rape and resulting injuries but do not identify the
defendant.83
Questions are also raised when victims are subjected to
sexual assaults and are then sent to a forensic unit for
evaluation, which would appear to implicate testimonial
concerns. Even here, some courts consider statements made to
forensic nurses or to medical personnel in forensic units to be
nontestimonial, despite their likely use for purposes of

(Mass. 2005).
79
See, e.g., State v. Wright, 2007 WL 177690, at *11-13 (Minn. Jan.
25, 2007).
80
State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 527 (Conn. 2006), quoting In re T.T.,
815 N.E.2d 789, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (child abuse case).
81
See Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a
“Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay and
Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
82
See, e.g., State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906, 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
83
See, e.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1106-07 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006).
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prosecution.84 In discussing medical records, Clark v. State85
found that it could not properly evaluate if the statements were
testimonial because it was not clear who made them and whether
they were volunteered or elicited for purposes of medical
diagnosis. Thus, more detailed record keeping may be necessary
to determine admissibility.
III. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CRAWFORD/DAVIS APPROACH
A major problem with Davis’ focus on ongoing emergencies
is that it ignores a question that is key to any sound
Confrontation Clause analysis: whether cross-examination would
serve an important function at trial. Instead, claiming historical
justification, which has been challenged both by then-Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Crawford,86 and by the historian Thomas
Davies,87 Davis asks why the statement was made, as if sincerity
alone was at the heart of the right to confrontation. Even Justice
Scalia softened his rigidly originalist Crawford analysis when he
stated in Davis, “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the
precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe
for its extinction.”88 In the Crawford and Beyond symposium,
Professor Tuerkheimer correctly critiques Davis as being out of
sync with the realities of domestic violence, which she suggests
would be better served by a relational approach that
84

See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 836-37 (Ohio 2006)
(holding rape victim’s statements to nurse practitioner at forensic unit were
nontestimonial); see generally, Allie Phillips, HealthCare Providers’ Roles
After Crawford, Davis & Hammon, 40 PROSECUTOR 18 (Oct. 2006)
(discussing forensic nurse case law and suggesting ways to ensure statements
are considered to be nontestimonial).
85
No. A-8890, 2006 WL 2578642 (Alaska App. Sept. 6, 2006).
86
541 U.S. at 69-74 (concurring in judgment).
87
See generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington,
71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’
Design:” How the Framing Era Ban against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the
Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Orginial
Confrontation Clause, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 349 (2007).
88
126 S. Ct. at 2278 n.5.
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acknowledges the context of the battering relationship.89
However, in my view the testimonial approach cannot easily
accommodate that shift doctrinally. Unfortunately, this
approach, which is rooted in a timeframe when women were
still subject to the common law rule of thumb which permitted a
husband to beat his wife with a rod “no thicker than his
thumb,”90 is not likely to produce a result favorable to domestic
violence victims.91 Therefore, while I agree with Professor
Tuerkheimer about the importance of forfeiture, I would also
rethink the domestic violence litigation framework, targeting
criminal justice resources to obtain more pretrial crossexamination, and encourage women to testify, even if they
recant their accusations.92
The testimonial approach ignores the classic role of crossexamination in exposing mistake, and in the case of modern
expansive interpretations of excited utterances, highlighting the
possibility of fabrication. It also downplays the function of
cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation as to
nontestimonial hearsay. This is particularly troubling given that
the world of the founding fathers had very little hearsay in
contrast to the liberal creation of modern hearsay exceptions by
federal and state governments. The fact that most of today’s
hearsay could not be admitted in 1791 seems not to be factored
into the current Confrontation Clause analysis, even though the
newly minted and expansively interpreted hearsay exceptions are
surely a product of the same government that the founders
distrusted enough to adopt the Confrontation Clause.
The practical difficulty in modern Confrontation Clause
analysis is how to harmonize the right of confrontation with
modern trial practices that thrive on hearsay. The reliability
approach of Roberts and its progeny totally denigrated the right
of cross-examination and live testimony. Yet Crawford and
89

See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to
Confrontation and Its Loss, 15 J. L & POL’Y 725 (2007).
90
See State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 13 (S.D. 1992) (discussing
history of domestic violence).
91
Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 312.
92
Id.at 367-73.
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Davis have substituted an approach that is almost arbitrary in its
result, with the potential of unfairly harming both the
prosecution and the defense. Confrontation is absolutely required
for statements labeled “testimonial,” regardless of the absence of
any fault by the prosecution in failing to secure crossexamination, even when such statements are both reliable and
the only evidence on the disputed issue. For example, it does
not matter that the unavailable victim died unexpectedly in an
unrelated accident, even though the victim was the only
eyewitness to the crime and the other evidence is inconclusive as
to the defendant’s guilt. Yet confrontation is denied for all other
statements, even when cross-examination is critical, with at best
a reliability check for statements that are admitted via hearsay
exceptions that are not firmly rooted.93 Thus, the focus is not on
the impact of the statement to the defense and the criticality of
cross-examination, but on the abstract notion of whether the
statement is defined as testimonial.
In contrast, an accusatory approach to defining what is
testimonial, as had been suggested by Professor Mosteller,94
93

See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 323-25 (arguing that
nontestimonial hearsay should be reviewed for reliability, whether under
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990), or under a due process
rationale). While Davis asserts that testimonial statements define the
perimeter, not simply the core of the right to Confrontation, 126 S. Ct. at
2274, this dicta is not necessary to its holding, since an excited utterance
would not require any additional reliability analysis under the Roberts’
progeny. Moreover, Crawford did not challenge the holding in Wright,
excluding unreliable hearsay of a child to a private doctor, which would
appear to be an incorrect result unless the statement was testimonial. PostDavis cases are split as to whether nontestimonial hearsay must be reliable.
See generally James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report On Ohio
v. Roberts, 21 CRIM. JUST. 37 (Fall, 2005). However, in Whorton v. Bocktin,
127 S.Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007), Justice Alito unequivocally states tat under
Crawford, “the Confrontation Clause has no application to such
[nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they
lack indicia of reliability.”
94
See generally Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic
Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14
(Summer, 2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay
Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK.
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appears closer to satisfying concerns about the need for crossexamination, as well as promoting the fairness values associated
with requiring witnesses to appear at trial and face the accused
when testifying. Davis’ concentration on discerning primary
intent in situations that clearly manifest equally strong ties to the
dual goals of obtaining help and assisting the prosecution will
simply create a new set of crazy quilt results that will no doubt
be as unpredictable, and in some cases as unfair, as those
produced by Roberts.
Moreover, to the extent that the objective test results in
ignoring an improper subjective motivation of an officer to
create testimony to be used at trial, it could result in decisions
that are viewed as unjust. In other words, the objective test
adopted by Whren v. United States95 and its progeny in the
Fourth Amendment context has provoked an outcry because it
could allow a car stop when probable cause exists, despite the
decision of an officer to stop the defendant for an improper
purpose, such as racial profiling.96 Similarly, some fear that an
objective Sixth Amendment standard could also mask potential
prosecutorial misconduct. Given the ambiguous references in
Crawford and Davis about whether interrogation should be
viewed from the officer’s perspective even if the declarant is
unaware of the improper motivation, one would hope that while
the declarant’s intent should typically control the confrontation
analysis, that improper police motivation would also result in a
statement being deemed testimonial. It has been suggested that
the Court should exclude evidence if it is found that police
officers systematically attempt to evade the Confrontation
Clause.97 This would be in accord with Missouri v. Seibert,
which excluded a confession obtained by a technique that “by
any objective measure reveal[ed] a police strategy adapted to
L. REV. 411 (2005) (arguing that the most important feature is the core
concern of whether certain witnesses were making criminal accusations
against the defendant. Beyond that, a rigid formula should not be imposed).
95
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
96
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001)
(O’Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
97
Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 220.
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undermine the Miranda warnings.”98
IV. ESTABLISHING FORFEITURE AND OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Davis reiterated Crawford’s suggestion that forfeiture could
result in admitting testimonial statements that were otherwise
banned by the Confrontation Clause, on equitable grounds.99
While Davis refused to treat domestic violence differently from
other cases in the testimonial analysis, it recognized that “[t]his
particular type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation
or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at
trial.”100 Such offending conduct was described as
“undermin[ing] the judicial process by procuring or coercing
silence from witnesses and victims.”101 Moreover, the defendant
was said to “have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that
destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system.”102 However,
no guidance was given about the specific evidence needed to
demonstrate forfeiture and whether intent to intimidate a witness
is necessary.
I stand by my earlier views of forfeiture, that intent should
not be required in cases where the defendant has murdered the
victim.103 Despite the fact that historically, forfeiture was limited
to witness-tampering cases,104 after Crawford most courts have
applied the doctrine to admit statements of murdered domestic
violence victims, where witness tampering is not involved.105
For example, in United States v. Garcia-Meza,106 the Court
98

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004).
126 S. Ct. at 2280.
100
Id. at 2279-80.
101
Id. at 2280.
102
Id.
103
Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 363-64.
104
See generally James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the
Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing,” 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1193 (2006) (arguing that intent has always been required).
105
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. 2006)
(discussing caselaw, but not resolving issue of whether intent is necessary).
106
403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005). Accord State v. Brooks, No.
99
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specifically noted that the federal forfeiture hearsay exception’s
requirement that the defendant intended to prevent the witness
from testifying did not control the constitutional analysis of
forfeiture. In other words, constitutional forfeiture is not
restricted by the statutory requirements of Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6). Mattox v. United States107 rejected a
Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of the prior
testimony of two witnesses in a murder trial who had died
before the retrial.108 Rereading Mattox reinforces my belief that,
as is often expressed in other contexts, the Constitution is not a
suicide pact. In discussing the relationship of death to
confrontation, Mattox noted that such rules of law, “however
beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case.”109 My only hesitation about abandoning
intent is Justice Scalia’s brief mention in Davis that forfeiture
was codified by Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), since that
would appear to equate the rule with the constitutional doctrine.
This dicta, however, was general and did not address
interpreting forfeiture in domestic violence cases when the
victim’s death is often accomplished in ways that are aimed at
frustrating prosecution. Previous violence and threats instill fear
in the victims who downplay their risk of continuing danger, and
their murders are often accomplished at home without witnesses.
These victim’s statements are best analogized to the dying
declarations of individuals whose deaths are witnessed.110 After
Davis, courts have continued to approve of the use of forfeiture
in murders implicating domestic violence without requiring any
intent to prohibit her from testifying at trial.111
W2004-02834-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2523991, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Aug. 31, 2006).
107
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
108
Id. at 240.
109
Id. at 243.
110
See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 363-64.
111
See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007) (finding forfeiture
where defendant claimed self defense in killing former girlfriend and her
statements concerned an unrelated claim of domestic violence); State v.
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State v. Romero,112 a pre-Davis decision that was bound by
jurisdictional case law that required intent for establishing
forfeiture, discussed what it characterized as compelling reasons
as to why a showing of intent to procure silence should not be
required in cases where the defendant has killed the witness.113
Citing cases that applied forfeiture without a showing of intent,
Romero noted two reasons to reject intent: (1) cases confused
forfeiture with waiver, and (2) forfeiture is equitable, and does
not hinge on the defendant’s motive.114 While I question whether
totally unreliable hearsay should come in by forfeiture,
practically, the evidence being admitted in domestic violence
homicides comes in via what Roberts would have called firmly
rooted exceptions such as excited utterances, or ad hoc
trustworthiness exceptions that would meet any constitutionally
based reliability test. In other words, they are not being admitted
via the forfeiture exception.
Most domestic violence forfeiture cases will relate to live
victims who do not appear. In such cases, I agree that the
traditional definition of forfeiture that requires intent to procure
the absence or silence of the witness should be followed.
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to identify the cause for the
victim’s nonappearance at trial. As State v. Mechling noted,
some victims fear retaliation, which can include threats not only
to the victim, but also to the victim’s children.115
Indeed, some women fear that the batterers will claim
custody of their child or cause the victim to come under scrutiny
of the child welfare system. The suggestion of some prosecutors
that forfeiture should be presumed when a domestic violence
victim is absent from trial has not gained any judicial support. I
disagree that battering relationships can by themselves establish
Brooks, 2006 WL 2523991, at *8 (finding forfeiture where defendant beat his
girlfriend to death). Cf. State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 533-34 (Wis.
2007) (finding forfeiture where wife was murdered by husband, but no
evidence existed of prior domestic violence).
112
133 P.3d 842 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
113
Id. at 852.
114
Id.; accord, Giles, 152 P.3d 433.
115
State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 324, n.11 (W. Va. 2006)
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forfeiture116 because I believe that individualized evidence is
required. I am also uncomfortable with applying a presumption
of forfeiture for unavailable domestic violence victims, since the
burden of proof should be on the prosecutor, rather than on the
defendant, because it is difficult to prove a negative. In other
words, requiring the defendant to show there were reasons other
than coercion for the victim’s absence may be more difficult
than requiring the prosecution to establish evidence of
intimidation. However, I recognize that if the presumption only
affects the burden of production, and not the burden of
persuasion, the defendant could rebut it by any evidence of
another reason the complainant did not appear.
Even decisions such as Mechling117 that appear receptive to
forfeiture require fact-based evidence of forfeiture in the specific
case. However, the specific pattern of abuse in each case should
be considered in the forfeiture analysis because it provides the
context for understanding the pressure that is brought to bear by
the defendant on the victim in the case. Thus, previous history
should be factored into the analysis, including prior charges of
abuse, and any previous recantations by the declarant. Similarly,
evidence of further abuse after the incident should be considered
as conduct aimed at procuring absence or lack of cooperation
even when no direct threat can be demonstrated.118 Moreover,
PTSD should be considered a significant factor in deciding
forfeiture, since the victim’s hypersensitive responses can be
traced to the defendant’s initial conduct. As Mechling pointed
out, decisions concerning forfeiture are most difficult when the
batterer’s actions, such as threats about her never calling the
police, precede the current domestic charge.119
Davis suggested, without deciding, that forfeiture would be
decided by a preponderance of the evidence standard,120 but did
not discuss any distinction between the showing necessary for a
116

See, e.g., Andrew King Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 39
CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 458 (2006).
117
633 S.E.2d at 324-26.
118
See, e.g., id. at 325.
119
Id.
120
126 S. Ct. at 2280.

RAEDER

6/22/2007 1:12 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

782

decision made pursuant to a federal evidentiary rule as opposed
to a constitutional mandate. Indeed, the Court ignored state
decisions requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard.
However, since the voluntariness of confessions and Miranda
violations are determined by a preponderance,121 it is difficult to
argue that forfeiture requires a higher standard, whether in a
hearsay exception or for constitutional purposes. The only
constitutional right that currently appears to impose a clear and
convincing evidence standard is found in the nearly 40-year old
decision of United States v. Wade, which permitted the
government to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a
constitutionally defective in-court identification was based upon
observations of the suspect apart from the lineup identification
held without counsel.122 Davis also indicated that hearsay
evidence, including the unavailable witness’ out-of-court
statements, may be considered at any forfeiture hearing,123 but
left open whether such statements alone can establish forfeiture,
or whether additional evidence is required.
Interestingly, Mechling discounts prosecution claims that
domestic violence convictions can never be obtained without the
use of the victim’s statements because convictions are routinely
obtained in murder cases without such statements.124 However,
this ignores the reality that the government allocates more
resources to murder prosecutions than to domestic violence
cases, particularly misdemeanors. Generally, prosecutors will be
forced to expend more resources to obtain evidence of
forfeiture. This could require sending an advocate or officer to
talk to the complainant or to neighbors who may have
information. Adam Krischer has provided a number of valuable
suggestions about obtaining evidence to support forfeiture.125
121

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972).
122
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
123
126 S. Ct. at 2280.
124
633 S.E.2d at 325, n.13.
125
Adam Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid:
Applying Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence
Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR 14, 15 (Dec. 2004).
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For example, phone records subpoenaed from jail may reveal
tapes or explain a recantation at trial. Voicemail messages, email, or caller ID logs indicating large numbers of calls may
also be useful.126 However, in a world of limited prosecutorial
resources, proving forfeiture in misdemeanor cases, which
encompass a large percentage of the current domestic violence
caseload, will likely be difficult, reinforcing my view that we
must rethink domestic violence prosecutions.
Other procedural issues also come into play. For example,
Davis recognized that some of the 911 statements may have been
testimonial, but suggested that in limine hearings could be used
to redact or exclude the testimonial portions of the statements.127
In this context, some attempts at parsing statements may result
in a determination that admission of the redacted statement
would be misleading, supporting exclusion for undue prejudice.
State v. Kirby,128 a case where the victim was kidnapped by a
friend of her husband, recognized that:
some isolated portions of the telephone call,
specifically when the complainant described to Gomes
the injuries and chest pains that affected her at the
time of the conversation, are not testimonial in nature
and, therefore, would not by themselves be barred
under Crawford. We conclude, however, that the
telephone recording remains inadmissible in its
entirety because the recording is so heavily dominated
by testimonial statements that redacting them in
accordance with the procedure directed in Davis v.
Washington . . . would leave the nontestimonial
portions of the conversation without any meaningful
context.129
Thus, attorneys must focus not only on whether statements
126

See, e.g., State v. Jens, 724 N.W.2d 702 (Table), No. 2005AP2144,
2006 WL 3007498, at ¶ 27 (Wis. App. Oct 24, 2006) (dealing with
audiotapes of telephone conversations where defendant discussed ways for
victim to avoid subpoena forfeited right to complain about her not testifying).
127
126 S. Ct. at 2277-78.
128
908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006).
129
Id. at 523 n.18.
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are testimonial, but also on whether they can be effectively
excised from otherwise admissible nontestimonial narratives.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR PROSECUTORS IN LIGHT OF DAVIS
Obviously, the shift in Confrontation Clause analysis makes
the testimony of the victim at trial or preliminary hearing
critical. Thus, the continued support of victim’s advocates and
coordinators remains a key component to successful prosecution,
and given the cost to the system and to victims’ autonomy, these
criminal justice resources should be allocated to risky offenders
and felonies, with diversion being the route for less serious
cases, or those with significant evidentiary problems.130
Moreover, while the vast majority of domestic violence
complainants have suffered psychological injuries beyond the
incident in question, it would be unrealistic to assume that
everyone who complains about a particular incident is telling the
truth.
Anecdotally, the most common causes of lying or
exaggeration relate to anger over male infidelity or child custody
disputes. Thus, prosecutors must use their independent judgment
in evaluating whether the victim is being entirely forthcoming
about the entire nature of the incident as well as whether the
refusal to cooperate is because a lying complainant has had a
change of heart. In other words, the need for confrontation is
not eliminated simply because the case relates to domestic
violence, even if most allegations are likely true and many
domestic violence victims do not call the police, let alone
testify.131
It is well known that even when the complainant is a true
victim of domestic violence, it is likely that she will recant when

130

See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 367-73; see also Paul C.
Friday, et al., Evaluating the Impact of a Specialized Domestic Violence
Police Unit (Oct. 2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/215916.pdf
(discussing targeting of more serious domestic violence offenders) (last
visited on March 25, 2007).
131
See, e.g., State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 324 (W. Va. 2006).
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she testifies at trial.132 While prior inconsistent statements are
typically admitted to impeach her credibility, it is their
substantive use that is necessary for successful domestic violence
prosecutions. Only a minority of states permit the substantive
use of all prior inconsistent statements of witnesses.133
Therefore, prosecutors should support efforts to enact such an
exception, which in conjunction with expert testimony and the
introduction of the defendant’s prior bad acts, will increase the
probability of conviction. Typically, there will be enough
circumstantial evidence to meet any challenge based on the
sufficiency of evidence when the prior inconsistent statement
provides a key element. In this regard, some states apply a
totality of the circumstances approach to reviewing the evidence
for sufficiency to uphold verdicts even where the inconsistent
statement provides the only evidence of identity of the
defendant.134 In jurisdictions where prior inconsistent statements
must be given under oath in a proceeding to be used
substantively, prosecutors should have the victim testify at a
preliminary hearing, even if they typically indict defendants or
are permitted to use hearsay at preliminary hearings.
In addition, because of the likelihood the victim will refuse
to testify, evidence of witness intimidation should always be
sought to support an argument of forfeiture. However, even if
the complainant testifies and recants, intimidation evidence
should be admissible as going to the bias of the witness. Such
evidence should survive a prejudice challenge since, as in United
States v. Abel,135 its probative value is extremely high in that it
explains the reason for the change of testimony in a way that
jurors can understand, as opposed to the less intuitive
explanation by experts as to why women do not readily leave
their batterers.
132

See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L.
REV. 747, 768-69 (2005).
133
See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 26.5-26.7 (7th
ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004); Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 351-52.
134
See, e.g, People v. Cuervas, 906 P.2d 1290, 1304 (Cal. 1995) (using
a substantial evidence test).
135
469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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A few prosecutors I have talked to over the years believe
that because women will virtually always downplay their
abuser’s conduct, it is better not to ask the woman for her
version of the facts before trial, and instead simply let the
woman testify. The explanation for why she has recanted her
initial statement to the police is offered via expert testimony,
other evidence and jury argument. While this approach might be
considered controversial, those who use it believe that
complainants are more likely to testify when they can retain
their dignity and do not feel doubly battered by the system. As a
result, focusing on the other evidence of abuse is felt to produce
more convictions than arguing with the victim. In a post-Davis
world, any approach that encourages women to testify should be
considered.
Only if cross-examination at the preliminary hearing is
limited will such testimony present a Crawford/Davis problem
when introduced at trial because of the absence of the witness.136
Indeed, where statutory limits on preliminary hearing testimony
exist, even if prosecutors are loath to urge expansion of
testimony at all preliminary hearings, they could in select cases
indicate to the judge that they will not object to full crossexamination, providing the opportunity necessary to meet a later
challenge if the witness does not appear at trial. While a statute
that only permits full examination in domestic violence, but not
other cases, might be questionable, creating a statutory exception
that allows full cross-examination for any case in which the
victim is uncooperative should pass constitutional muster. All
such cases, whether domestic violence or otherwise, would
warrant preservation of cross-examined testimony as quickly as
possible after the incident. In this regard, the statute could
include a presumption that full cross-examination of domestic
violence victims should be permitted in light of the empirical
evidence of their non-cooperation.
Finally, as Professor Lininger and I have argued, more use
136

Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 355-58 (discussing the
difference between limited and full cross-examination at preliminary
hearings); Cf., Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461, 468-70 (Ind. 2006)
(discovery deposition satisfied Crawford).
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should be made of federal prosecutions for gun possession.137
Large numbers of individuals are prohibited from owning a
weapon because they have been convicted of a qualifying
domestic violence misdemeanor or are subject to a qualifying
protective order.138 The federal penalties for violating these
statutes are typically greater than sentences for domestic
violence assaults.139 Moreover, such prosecutions typically do
not require the domestic violence victim to testify, because they
focus on the prohibited possession of the weapon in light of the
qualifying offense or protective order.140 Currently relatively
few federal domestic violence weapons related charges are
prosecuted, given the large number of individuals who run afoul
of such bans.141 Joint efforts by state and federal prosecutors are
needed to target dangerous domestic violence offenders who
would otherwise escape conviction due to witness noncooperation. In addition, many states do not criminalize weapon
possession by domestic violence offenders. Enacting such laws
pose a way to ensure that domestic violence offenders do not
escape conviction.
When convicting a defendant in the absence of the victim
appears problematic, it may be possible to forgo a new criminal
case if he has previously committed other crimes, whether
domestic violence related or not. The key is whether he is still
subject to probation, parole or supervised release, since his
conduct will also violate the conditions of his release. Such
violations are easier to prove because they are typically
established by a preponderance of the evidence,142 rather than by
the more exacting beyond a reasonable doubt standard. More
importantly, revocations are not subject to evaluation under the
137

Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence in Federal Court: Abused
Women as Victims, Survivors and Offenders, 19 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 91,
94 (Dec. 2006); see generally Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm
Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525 (2003).
138
Raeder, supra note * at 92.
139
Id. at 92-93.
140
Id. at 95.
141
Id. at 92-93.
142
See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005).
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Confrontation Clause, which is considered a trial right.143
Therefore, cross-examination can be denied for good cause,144
which would likely be established by the unavailability of the
declarant. In other words, hearsay is usually acceptable
evidence, unless so unreliable as to raise due process concerns.
Given Roberts’ endorsement of the reliability of firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions, the excited utterances that are the bread and
butter of domestic violence prosecutions would undoubtedly
meet any due process reliability test. Ironically, according to the
recital of the facts in Davis, Hammon was also found guilty of
violating his probation.145 However, neither the Indiana Supreme
Court nor the United States Supreme Court discussed whether
his sentence was longer than permitted solely for the violation of
probation, even though Hammon’s one-year sentence for the
new battery was suspended for all but 20 days, and he was
ordered to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and
counseling program.146 Of course, unless the defendant has
previously been convicted of a felony, any potential sentence
will not reflect the seriousness of many domestic violence
crimes, though revocations have the benefit of imposing swift
and predictable incarceration.
CONCLUSION
Crawford left many unanswered questions about how to
define testimonial statements in domestic violence cases, where
victims typically make frantic 911 calls or greet police officers
with frightened pleas for help when they arrive at the scene.
Since most domestic violence victims do not cooperate with the
prosecution, the two years after Crawford produced conflicting
143

See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (Powell, J.).
144
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985) (holding that
probationer is entitled under due process to cross-examine adverse witnesses,
unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation).
145
126 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
146
Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447.
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decisions about the admissibility of their excited utterances and
doomed many domestic violence prosecutions. In Davis, the
Court addressed the two most common domestic violence
scenarios, 911 calls and field investigations. Unfortunately,
Davis’ bright line for evaluating testimonial statements is likely
to prove illusory given the vagueness of its definition of ongoing
emergencies. In addition, courts must grapple with whether
intent is necessary to justify forfeiture. Nobody scored a
knockout punch in Davis: prosecutors must assume that most
statements of unavailable declarants made after the incident to
police are inadmissible, regardless of how excited the declarant
is; defense counsel must assume that most 911 calls will be
admitted, and may increasingly find that nontestimonial
statements are no longer tested for reliability; domestic violence
victims must assume that the context of their abuse will be
ignored in evaluating whether they face an ongoing emergency;
and judges must continue to read tea leaves until the Supreme
Court’s inevitable next foray into Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.

